Saturday 26th May 1917

Boeschepe training area, near Watou

A beautiful Summer day. Over the next week the Battalion was to be occupied in intensive training for the coming Messines attack, using trenches built to replicate the German defences in the area of Hill 60 and the Caterpillar with which the Battalion was already so familiar from their previous tours and which would be the objective of their assault on 7^th June. In their training they were assisted also by a scale model, based on maps and aerial photographs, which had been constructed by Lt. Oakley of 8^th Yorkshires. The meticulous nature of the planning for the attack has been highlighted as one of the key reasons for the success of the operation.

Detailed orders for the attack to be made by 69^th Brigade as part of the opening of the Battle of Messines had been first issued on 19^th May and revised five days later. These orders would form the basis of the rehearsals and instruction which were to take place over the following two weeks. The need for secrecy was impressed in the opening of the orders which stated that, “Officers, NCO’s and men are strictly forbidden to enter into any conversation on the subject in public places or at any time excepted when required by duty”. The Division had been allocated the far left (north) of the British Second Army attack. The divisional assault was to be conducted by two brigades across a frontage of around 2,000 yards astride the railway line in the Hill 60 sector. 70^th Brigade had the far left flank, attacking north-east of Hill 60 and was also charged with holding the defensive flank which would be created by the limit of the British advance. To their right (south) was the section of front allocated to 69^th Brigade, from Windy Corner (I.35.a.0.2) to The Snout (I.29.d.3.7). They would be attacking across the German defences at Hill 60, the Caterpillar and on through Battle Wood toward, and ultimately beyond, the Ypres-Commines Canal. 10^th Battalion were responsible for the far right sector of the Divisional front with 11th West Yorks and 8th Yorkshires to their left.

The orders laid out the plans for a five-day preliminary bombardment, building on existing artillery barrages intended to destroy the German wire, and for the detonation of a series of mines along the German front line. Following the detonation of the mines there would be a ‘creeping barrage’, advancing successively from the German front line at specified intervals to support and shield the advancing infantry. The infantry assault was to commence fifteen seconds (the plan had originally specified two minutes) after the detonation of the mines, with the assault “to be carried through without halt as close up to the barrage as possible”. Prior to the detonation “all dugouts and subways will be evacuated and assaulting troops formed up lying down in front of their trenches”.

The ultimate objective was to penetrate the German lines to a depth of around 1,400 yards, to what was known in the plan as the black line. This advance was to be conducted in two phases. In phase one the advance would be firstly to the red line (roughly the line of the German support trenches) and then, after only a short delay, straight on to the intermediate objective (the blue line). For 10^th Battalion this was towards the southern edge of Battle Wood. At this point there was to be an extended pause in the assault of around three hours to allow for consolidation and reinforcement of the ground won and for fresh troops to pass through and carry the attack forward. There would then be a further advance to the black line, beyond the original German defences and located so as to give a commanding position over the plain to the east. In 10^th Battalion’s case this black line lay beyond the southern edge of Battle Wood and across the Ypres-Commines Canal.

Plan of 69th Brigade positions and three lines of objectives.

10DWR was designated 'A' Battalion

The specific plan for 10DWR provided for the first wave of the attack to be carried out by ‘D’ Company on the left and by ‘A’ Company on the right advancing in extended order and to press on, without delay, through the red line objective and on to the blue line, where they were to halt and consolidate. Immediately behind this first wave was to be a second wave, of one platoon each from ‘C’ and ‘B’ Companies. Their task was to clear and consolidate the German support and reserve lines, leaving clear indications (by the use of coloured flags) as to which dugouts had been cleared of the enemy. Behind these ‘moppers up’ (as the second wave was designated) were two further waves, comprising the rest of ‘C’ and ‘B’ Companies who were to clear and consolidate the red and blue lines and also to ensure passage between the two lines through the communication trenches. The timing of the British barrage allowed for three minutes from zero hour before it would lift from the German front line; seventeen minutes later the barrage would lift from the red line and finally, at zero plus 45 minutes, the barrage would lift from the blue line, allowing the troops to advance to their final first phase objectives.

There was a clear statement in the orders of the need to secure the first phase objectives before the final advance to the black line, to be carried out by fresh troops from 9^th Yorkshires and 12^th DLI, was attempted. Two key strongpoints were to be established as soon as possible in the old German support line; each of them manned by two machine guns and twenty riflemen. Battalion HQ would also be moved forward as soon as the blue line was secured. The planning for the transmission of ammunition, equipment and other essentials to the new positions was meticulous, down to an individual level. Troops in the fourth wave had the principal responsibility and in each platoon specific sections were to be responsible for the delivery of wire and stakes; sandbags; bombs (grenades); and small arms ammunition. Having deposited their initial loads these carrying parties were given strict instructions as for their return journeys:

“Carrying parties on return journeys must bring back salvage or prisoners. If there are none of these, rifle and equipment from casualties nearby must be carried back. Parties must never return empty-handed. The NCO in charge of each section must keep his men closed up together.”

These carrying parties were to wear distinctive yellow armlets to ensure their passage through the lines as:

“No NCO or man is allowed to move back from the front (except wounded) unless he is wearing a distinctive armlet. Any men so found are likely to be arrested by Battle Police. … Wounded men must not be allowed to discard their arms and equipment unless their wounds are so severe as to render the men incapable of carrying them. Slight wounded walking cases who have disobeyed this order will be sent back by Battle Police to fetch their rifle and equipment.”

The minutiae of these orders serves to confirm the meticulous nature of the planning.

A similar level of detail was transmitted to the men with regard to the arrangements for the passage of information. The captured German positions were to be clearly marked with signboards indicating their new identification (‘blue line’, ‘red line’ etc). Large quantities of very lights for use in signalling were to be carried by all Companies and comprehensive instructions were given for the precise manner in which runners were to be used in the despatch of messages. All messages were to be issued in duplicate and carried by two runners, to be despatched fifty yards apart, carrying the messages in their top right hand pocket. Details were made clear as to exactly how the messages were then to be relayed back to Battalion HQ. A forward signals party was to advance with the fourth wave (the carrying parties) so as to “miss the enemy barrage but must not take any part in the fighting”. This party would then establish communications (by runner) from the front line back to Battalion HQ. There was also a stern reminder in the orders regarding any failure to press home the attack:

“It must be impressed on all ranks that the word of command "RETIRE" does not exist. The enemy use it frequently as a ruse. It is only in very exceptional cases that men should be ordered to withdraw. In such cases the order will be "WITHDRAW". Anyone using the "RETIRE" will be treated as an enemy.”

The prescribed ‘fighting kit’ for the men was to be steel helmet; haversack on back; water bottle filled; entrenching tool; waterproof sheet; one large tool on back of every other man in proportion of 5 shovels to 2 picks; tube helmet; box respirator; field dressing; two sandbags per man; two grenades, one in each top pocket of jacket, to be collected by section commanders on reaching objective and used to form a reserve; 120 rounds small arms ammunition; two flares every other man, one in each bottom pocket of jacket; one iron ration; one day’s preserved meat and biscuits”. It was also ordered that, “All Infantry Officers must be dressed and equipped the same as their men. Sticks are not to be carried”; clear lessons had been learned about the capacity of the Germans to identify and target officers during attacks.

With time to reflect on recent events, a number of the colleagues of Pte. Arthur Gill (see 22^nd May) who had been killed a few days earlier, wrote home to his family. Pte. William Boodle (see 22^nd May) had been with him at the time and had himself been injured; "I am sorry to tell you that your son was killed on May 22^nd, about 2-50 a.m. He had just got into a dugout to have a sleep after being on patrol all night, and he had not been in it an hour when the Germans opened a very heavy bombardment upon us. The first shell knocked the dugout in and buried five of us. We got out all right, but suddenly found that your boy was still under, being covered with the remains of the dugout. I at once started to dig him out, and after working for an hour succeeded. I then got him on to a stretcher and saw him out of shellfire, as I was for hospital myself. His last wish as we parted was that I should write to you. We have been chums ever since we came to the Battalion, and I shall miss him very much. I can quite understand your feelings at the sad news which this letter brings you, and if ever I have the good luck to get over again I will come and see you and explain how it happened, as I live in Leeds myself." Pte. John William Atkinson MM (see 22^nd May) had been one of the stretcher bearers who had attended to Gill; “You will no doubt have heard about the death of your loving son Arthur, as I wrote to my wife and mother to let you know. Well, the Germans gave us a terrible bombardment on the 22^nd inst. I am sorry to say Arthur was in a dug-out which they knocked in with a shell, and he was very badly wounded and died nearly right away. It is with deepest sympathy that I am writing this letter, but I thought it my duty to let you know as early as possible. He was very well respected by all, and I am sorry to say we have lost such a good soldier. He, however, died a hero doing his duty to the last. I hope our Heavenly Father will be a comforter to you in this awful hour of trial and trouble." 2Lt. Robert Oswald Milligan (see 6^th November 1916) was Gill’s platoon officer; “You have probably by this time been informed officially of the extremely sad death in action of your son. Gill had been in my platoon from the time he joined this battalion and was always a favourite amongst his fellows. His cheery spirit made him popular wherever he went, and he was one of the men on whom I could always depend. Some months ago I chose him as my 'runner,' that is, my constant attendant in action, and it was his lot to be by my side during many a lonely watch and in many an exciting hour. He received his unfortunate wound whilst resting. Only a few hours before his death, during a very heavy bombardment, we both escaped miraculously from a shell which burst within six feet of us. And so, having my self realised his worth, I can in some small way realise how great is your loss. Please convey to his mother my deep sympathy, and be assured that I hope and pray that you all may have strength to bear your great loss, and to feel the pride of having sacrificed so much for the great cause." Sgt. Alfred Dolding (see 10^th May) also wrote; “I am writing to let you know how sorry the lads and myself are at having lost your son Arthur. He was loved by everyone in the platoon, and he died doing his duty. He was always cheerful, and had a good word for everybody. He never once gave me an anxious moment, as his Platoon Sergeant. I can speak as I found him. I know it seems very hard for so young a boy to be cut off - but I believe he will receive a just reward for the good life he lived. I hope you will accept our deepest sympathy. Your, son was a good boy."

Sgt. George Richard Goodchild (see 28^th March) was appointed Orderly Room Clerk.

Sgt. George Richard Goodchild

Image by kind permission of Henry Bolton

Pte. John Killerby (see 5^th May) again found himself on a charge, this time for being “improperly dressed on parade”; he was ordered to be confined to barracks for three days.

Pte. Fred Heppinstall (see 21^st April), who had only returned to duty a month earlier following treatment for scabies, again reported sick with the same complaint; he was admitted to 70^th Field Ambulance at Landbouver Farm, north-west of Reninghest before being transferred, two days later, to 50^th Casualty Clearing Station at Mont des Cats.

Pte. Harold Peel (see 3^rd May) re-joined the Battalion from 50^th Casualty Clearing Station at Hazebrouck having been treated for three weeks for scabies.
Cpl. John Stewart (see 16^th May) who had spent the previous ten days at 23^rd Division Rest Station at Waratah Camp, south-east of Poperinghe, suffering from ‘Pyrexia, NYD’ (high temperature, not yet diagnosed), was now discharged to duty.

Pte. Thomas Wood joined the battalion; he was a 24 year-old packer from Bethnal Green and married with one daughter. He had been due to join some weeks earlier, having been posted to France in late March. However, on arrival in France he had reported sick, suffering from an inguinal hernia. He had been admitted to 4^th General Hospital at Camiers for treatment and had then been posted to 34^th Infantry Base Depot at Etaples where he had spent five weeks.

After spending a week at 13^th General Hospital at Boulogne being treated for shrapnel wounds, Pte. Walter Pedley (see 16^th January) was evacuated to England onboard the Hospital Ship St. Denis; it is not clear to which hospital he was admitted once in England.

Pte. Thomas Legg (see 4^th April) was discharged from the Lord Derby War Hospital in Warrington; he would have ten days’ leave before reporting to Northern Command Depot at Ripon.

Cpl. James Shackleton MM (see 17^th March), who was in England having been seriously wounded in February, was married, at Ingrow Church, to Edith Davies.

Cpl. James Shackleton MM

Pte. George Slater (see 29^th August 1916), who had been back in England since being wounded on the Somme in July 1916, appeared before an army medical board. The board found him unfit for active service and ordered that he be transferred to the Army Reserve, Class P; this classification of the reserve had been introduced in October 1916 and applied to men “whose services were deemed to be temporarily of more value to the country in civil life rather than in the Army”.  

William Neville Dawson (see 10^th February), who had been ordered to relinquish his commission  following extended proceedings regarding his capacity to hold the post of Second Lieutenant, re-enlisted in the army at Barnard Castle, joining 16^th (Transport Workers) Battalion York and Lancasters.