Boeschepe training area, near Watou
A beautiful Summer day. Over the next week the Battalion
was to be occupied in intensive training for the coming Messines attack, using
trenches built to replicate the German defences in the area of Hill 60 and the
Caterpillar with which the Battalion was already so familiar from their
previous tours and which would be the objective of their assault on 7th
June. In their training they were assisted also by a scale model, based on maps
and aerial photographs, which had been constructed by Lt. Oakley of 8th
Yorkshires. The meticulous
nature of the planning for the attack has been highlighted as one of the key
reasons for the success of the operation.
Detailed orders for the attack to be made by 69th
Brigade as part of the opening of the Battle of Messines had been first issued
on 19th May and revised five days later. These orders would form the
basis of the rehearsals and instruction which were to take place over the
following two weeks. The need for secrecy was impressed in the opening of the
orders which stated that, “Officers, NCO’s and men are strictly forbidden to
enter into any conversation on the subject in public places or at any time
excepted when required by duty”. The Division had been allocated the far left
(north) of the British Second Army attack. The divisional assault was to be
conducted by two brigades across a frontage of around 2,000 yards astride the
railway line in the Hill 60 sector. 70th Brigade had the far left
flank, attacking north-east of Hill 60 and was also charged with holding the
defensive flank which would be created by the limit of the British advance. To
their right (south) was the section of front allocated to 69th
Brigade, from Windy Corner (I.35.a.0.2) to The Snout (I.29.d.3.7). They would
be attacking across the German defences at Hill 60, the Caterpillar and on
through Battle Wood toward, and ultimately beyond, the Ypres-Commines Canal. 10th
Battalion were responsible for the far right sector of the Divisional front
with 11th West Yorks and 8th Yorkshires to their left.
The orders laid out the plans for a five-day preliminary
bombardment, building on existing artillery barrages intended to destroy the
German wire, and for the detonation of a series of mines along the German front
line. Following the detonation of the mines there would be a ‘creeping
barrage’, advancing successively from the German front line at specified
intervals to support and shield the advancing infantry. The infantry assault
was to commence fifteen seconds (the plan had originally specified two minutes)
after the detonation of the mines, with the assault “to be carried through
without halt as close up to the barrage as possible”. Prior to the detonation
“all dugouts and subways will be evacuated and assaulting troops formed up
lying down in front of their trenches”.
The ultimate objective was to penetrate the German lines to
a depth of around 1,400 yards, to what was known in the plan as the black line.
This advance was to be conducted in two phases. In phase one the advance would
be firstly to the red line (roughly the line of the German support trenches)
and then, after only a short delay, straight on to the intermediate objective
(the blue line). For 10th Battalion this was towards the southern
edge of Battle Wood. At this point there was to be an extended pause in the
assault of around three hours to allow for consolidation and reinforcement of
the ground won and for fresh troops to pass through and carry the attack
forward. There would then be a further advance to the black line, beyond the
original German defences and located so as to give a commanding position over
the plain to the east. In 10th Battalion’s case this black line lay
beyond the southern edge of Battle Wood and across the Ypres-Commines Canal.
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Plan of 69th Brigade positions and three lines of objectives.
10DWR was designated 'A' Battalion
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The specific plan for 10DWR provided for
the first wave of the attack to be carried out by ‘D’ Company on the left and
by ‘A’ Company on the right advancing in extended order and to press on,
without delay, through the red line objective and on to the blue line, where
they were to halt and consolidate. Immediately behind this first wave was to be
a second wave, of one platoon each from ‘C’ and ‘B’ Companies. Their task was
to clear and consolidate the German support and reserve lines, leaving clear
indications (by the use of coloured flags) as to which dugouts had been cleared
of the enemy. Behind these ‘moppers up’ (as the second wave was designated)
were two further waves, comprising the rest of ‘C’ and ‘B’ Companies who were
to clear and consolidate the red and blue lines and also to ensure passage
between the two lines through the communication trenches. The timing of the
British barrage allowed for three minutes from zero hour before it would lift
from the German front line; seventeen minutes later the barrage would lift from
the red line and finally, at zero plus 45 minutes, the barrage would lift from
the blue line, allowing the troops to advance to their final first phase
objectives.
There was a clear statement in the orders of the need to
secure the first phase objectives before the final advance to the black line,
to be carried out by fresh troops from 9th Yorkshires and 12th
DLI, was attempted. Two key strongpoints were to be established as soon as
possible in the old German support line; each of them manned by two machine
guns and twenty riflemen. Battalion HQ would also be moved forward as soon as
the blue line was secured. The planning for the transmission of ammunition,
equipment and other essentials to the new positions was meticulous, down to an
individual level. Troops in the fourth wave had the principal responsibility
and in each platoon specific sections were to be responsible for the delivery
of wire and stakes; sandbags; bombs (grenades); and small arms ammunition.
Having deposited their initial loads these carrying parties were given strict
instructions as for their return journeys:
“Carrying parties on return journeys must bring back salvage
or prisoners. If there are none of these, rifle and equipment from casualties
nearby must be carried back. Parties must never return empty-handed. The NCO in
charge of each section must keep his men closed up together.”
These carrying parties were to wear distinctive yellow
armlets to ensure their passage through the lines as:
“No NCO or man is allowed to move back from the front (except
wounded) unless he is wearing a distinctive armlet. Any men so found are likely
to be arrested by Battle Police. … Wounded men must not be allowed to discard
their arms and equipment unless their wounds are so severe as to render the men
incapable of carrying them. Slight wounded walking cases who have disobeyed
this order will be sent back by Battle Police to fetch their rifle and
equipment.”
The minutiae of these orders serves to confirm the
meticulous nature of the planning.
A similar level of detail was transmitted to the men with
regard to the arrangements for the passage of information. The captured German
positions were to be clearly marked with signboards indicating their new
identification (‘blue line’, ‘red line’ etc). Large quantities of very lights
for use in signalling were to be carried by all Companies and comprehensive
instructions were given for the precise manner in which runners were to be used
in the despatch of messages. All messages were to be issued in duplicate and
carried by two runners, to be despatched fifty yards apart, carrying the
messages in their top right hand pocket. Details were made clear as to exactly
how the messages were then to be relayed back to Battalion HQ. A forward
signals party was to advance with the fourth wave (the carrying parties) so as
to “miss the enemy barrage but must not take any part in the fighting”. This
party would then establish communications (by runner) from the front line back
to Battalion HQ. There was also a stern reminder in the orders regarding any
failure to press home the attack:
“It must be impressed on all ranks that the word of command
"RETIRE" does not exist. The enemy use it frequently as a ruse. It is
only in very exceptional cases that men should be ordered to withdraw. In such cases
the order will be "WITHDRAW". Anyone using the "RETIRE"
will be treated as an enemy.”
The prescribed ‘fighting kit’ for the men was to be steel
helmet; haversack on back; water bottle filled; entrenching tool; waterproof
sheet; one large tool on back of every other man in proportion of 5 shovels to
2 picks; tube helmet; box respirator; field dressing; two sandbags per man; two
grenades, one in each top pocket of jacket, to be collected by section
commanders on reaching objective and used to form a reserve; 120 rounds small
arms ammunition; two flares every other man, one in each bottom pocket of
jacket; one iron ration; one day’s preserved meat and biscuits”. It was also
ordered that, “All Infantry Officers must be dressed and equipped the same as
their men. Sticks are not to be carried”; clear lessons had been learned about
the capacity of the Germans to identify and target officers during attacks.
With time to reflect on recent events, a number of the
colleagues of Pte. Arthur
Gill (see 22nd May)
who had been killed a few days earlier, wrote home to his family. Pte. William Boodle (see 22nd May) had been with him at the time and had
himself been injured; "I am sorry to tell you that your son was killed on
May 22nd, about 2-50 a.m. He had just got into a dugout to have a
sleep after being on patrol all night, and he had not been in it an hour when
the Germans opened a very heavy bombardment upon us. The first shell knocked
the dugout in and buried five of us. We got out all right, but suddenly found that
your boy was still under, being covered with the remains of the dugout. I at
once started to dig him out, and after working for an hour succeeded. I then
got him on to a stretcher and saw him out of shellfire, as I was for hospital
myself. His last wish as we parted was that I should write to you. We have been
chums ever since we came to the Battalion, and I shall miss him very much. I
can quite understand your feelings at the sad news which this letter brings
you, and if ever I have the good luck to get over again I will come and see you
and explain how it happened, as I live in Leeds myself." Pte. John William Atkinson MM (see 22nd May) had been one of
the stretcher bearers who had attended to Gill; “You will no doubt have
heard about the death of your loving son Arthur, as I wrote to my wife and
mother to let you know. Well, the Germans gave us a terrible bombardment on the
22nd inst. I am sorry to say Arthur was in a dug-out which they
knocked in with a shell, and he was very badly wounded and died nearly right
away. It is with deepest sympathy that I am writing this letter, but I thought
it my duty to let you know as early as possible. He was very well respected by
all, and I am sorry to say we have lost such a good soldier. He, however, died
a hero doing his duty to the last. I hope our Heavenly Father will be a
comforter to you in this awful hour of trial and trouble." 2Lt. Robert Oswald Milligan (see 6th November 1916) was
Gill’s platoon officer; “You have probably by this time been informed officially
of the extremely sad death in action of your son. Gill had been in my platoon
from the time he joined this battalion and was always a favourite amongst his
fellows. His cheery spirit made him popular wherever he went, and he was one of
the men on whom I could always depend. Some months ago I chose him as my
'runner,' that is, my constant attendant in action, and it was his lot to be by
my side during many a lonely watch and in many an exciting hour. He received
his unfortunate wound whilst resting. Only a few hours before his death, during
a very heavy bombardment, we both escaped miraculously from a shell which burst
within six feet of us. And so, having my self realised his worth, I can in some
small way realise how great is your loss. Please convey to his mother my deep
sympathy, and be assured that I hope and pray that you all may have strength to
bear your great loss, and to feel the pride of having sacrificed so much for
the great cause." Sgt. Alfred
Dolding (see 10th May)
also wrote; “I am writing to let you know how sorry the lads and myself are at
having lost your son Arthur. He was loved by everyone in the platoon, and he
died doing his duty. He was always cheerful, and had a good word for everybody.
He never once gave me an anxious moment, as his Platoon Sergeant. I can speak
as I found him. I know it seems very hard for so young a boy to be cut off -
but I believe he will receive a just reward for the good life he lived. I hope
you will accept our deepest sympathy. Your, son was a good boy."
Sgt. George Richard
Goodchild (see 28th March)
was appointed Orderly Room Clerk.
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Sgt. George Richard Goodchild
Image by kind permission of Henry Bolton
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Pte. John Killerby
(see 5th May) again found
himself on a charge, this time for being “improperly dressed on parade”; he was
ordered to be confined to barracks for three days.
Pte. Fred Heppinstall
(see 21st April), who had
only returned to duty a month earlier following treatment for scabies, again reported
sick with the same complaint; he was admitted to 70th Field
Ambulance at Landbouver Farm, north-west of Reninghest before being
transferred, two days later, to 50th Casualty Clearing Station at
Mont des Cats.
Pte. Harold Peel
(see 3rd May) re-joined
the Battalion from 50th Casualty Clearing Station at Hazebrouck having
been treated for three weeks for scabies.
Cpl. John Stewart
(see 16th May) who had
spent the previous ten days at 23rd Division Rest Station at Waratah
Camp, south-east of Poperinghe, suffering from ‘Pyrexia, NYD’ (high
temperature, not yet diagnosed), was now discharged to duty.
Pte. Thomas Wood
joined the battalion; he was a 24 year-old packer from Bethnal Green and
married with one daughter. He had been due to join some weeks earlier, having
been posted to France in late March. However, on arrival in France he had
reported sick, suffering from an inguinal hernia. He had been admitted to 4th
General Hospital at Camiers for treatment and had then been posted to 34th
Infantry Base Depot at Etaples where he had spent five weeks.
After spending a week at 13th General Hospital at
Boulogne being treated for shrapnel wounds, Pte. Walter Pedley (see 16th
January) was evacuated to England onboard the Hospital Ship St. Denis; it is not clear to which
hospital he was admitted once in England.
Pte. Thomas Legg (see 4th April) was discharged
from the Lord Derby War Hospital in Warrington; he would have ten days’ leave
before reporting to Northern Command Depot at Ripon.
Cpl. James Shackleton
MM (see 17th March), who
was in England having been seriously wounded in February, was married, at
Ingrow Church, to Edith Davies.
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Cpl. James Shackleton MM |
Pte. George Slater
(see 29th August 1916), who
had been back in England since being wounded on the Somme in July 1916,
appeared before an army medical board. The board found him unfit for active
service and ordered that he be transferred to the Army Reserve, Class P; this
classification of the reserve had been introduced in October 1916 and applied
to men “whose services were deemed to be temporarily of more value to the
country in civil life rather than in the Army”.
William Neville
Dawson (see 10th February),
who had been ordered to relinquish his commission following extended proceedings regarding his
capacity to hold the post of Second Lieutenant, re-enlisted in the army at
Barnard Castle, joining 16th (Transport Workers) Battalion York and
Lancasters.